Introduction
Electric generators and distributors, in many cases no longer vertically integrated with guaranteed customers and suppliers, are starting to compete to sell and buy electricity. It is not at all clear, though, that current wholesale electricity markets produce economically optimal or efficient results. In fact, anecdotal evidence to the contrary has continually arisen. The purpose of this article, then, is to introduce market analysts to the study of model agent driven power market auctions. In particular, scenarios are examined where some of the players attempt to profit by intentionally driving market prices and creating economic instabilities. A double auction market of electricity is modeled, and different scenarios for malicious activities from the sellers' side are considered. The results of simulating using genetic algorithms and the Roth/Erv learning algorithm are summarized. It is shown that under commonly found circumstances some of the players can significantly influence the market for profit (their own). It is also noticed that structural market power exists when the uniform pricing algorithm is selected. It is also noticed that the buyers are very disadvantaged if they are not able to hide their valuation for the commodity.
Consequences of "Gaming the System"
Some countries and regions of the U.S. (e.g., California, PJM) are already operating in a restructured environment. However, there does not yet appear to be a standardized final market structure that works for all areas, but each market that springs up adds to our experience and helps us make the next market implementation work a little better and more competitively. The authors believe that, to some degree depending on the market implementation, regional commodity exchanges will play a key role in buying and selling electricity.
Methods and Techniques
Different models have been built to simulate the electric marketplace. In this study, a bilateral auction is constructed, with a fixed number of buyers and sellers of electricity. The bilateral contracts for fixed amounts of electric energy are entered into in fixed time intervals. The transmission system is loss less and has unlimited capacity for the results discussed within this report. The trading agents use a fixed set of rules to generate the bidding strategy. An independent third party performs the auction bid matching.
One round of bidding proceeds as follows. All buying/selling agents submit their bids/offers to a third party, an Independent Contract Administrator (ICA). All bids and offers are sorted by the ICA in descending and ascending order and juxtaposed. If a buy bid is higher than the corresponding sell offer, the two players are matched, a contract is approved and the players are notified. In the case where the buy bid is lower than the sell offer, the players are rejected and notified. There is no second call for bidding regardless of the number of contracts approved, A bid and offer midpoint, as well as an equilibrium price are calculated and the next round is called. Different pricing techniques can be studied using the model described here. Midpoint prices are calculated, which is used if discriminatory pricing is desired, and if non-discriminatory pricing is desired, the valid matches weighted by quantity are used to determine equilibrium price. Meanwhile the players update their strategy and the ICA calls for the next round.
Each player updates its strategy according to the outcome of the previous round. The player knows only the outcome of its own last action (e.g. contract accepted/rejected) and remembers the bid/offer value. If the offer was rejected, next time the seller lowers the price, choosing the value randomly within an interval it calculates based on a rule including its own last offer. Accordingly, the buyer bids are higher than the preceding round. If the offer was accepted, the seller offers a higher price based on a rule including the last accepted offer, and the buyer bids are reduced. All players start trading around a fixed equilibrium price submitted by ICA. This is done for convenience. In a real world situation the players can start bidding around the closing price for the previous day, for example. After the first round the ICA takes care only of matching players.
Experimental Design
The described system fairly quickly reaches equilibrium and the buy/sell spread. The midpoint price and the equilibrium price converge to a limiting value. An auction consisting of 100 players was evenly divided into buyers and sellers of electricity. The auction went through 10 rounds. In each case, revised bids and offers were set at 3-5°/0 of the last successful bid/offer, depending on whether the bid/offer was successful or not. A random generator created all four price updates, i.e. the players may choose price updates with equal probability within the prescribed price update interval. Such seemingly simple market behavior is very similar to what has been observed in experimental double auction markets played by people.
Genetic Algorithm
A genetic algorithm (GA) was the first technique used to separately evolve the bid prices of the buyers and the ask prices of the sellers. Each price offer (bid or ask) is first re~sented by a 10-bit string mapping to a floating-point number in the interval [0, 1.0) with step 1/2 0. Thus, each trader's feasible choice set in each auction round consists of 210 possible price offers. Each resulting price offer is then subjected to an affine transformation to obtain the final form of the trader's price offer. The bid price for each buyer is limited to the interval from MR-$40/MWh to MR, where MR denotes the buyer's marginal revenue, and the ask price of each seller is limited to the interval from MC to MC+$40iMWh, where MC denotes the seller's marginal cost.
The fitness of each trader at the end of each auction round is proportional to the profit it made in the round and is recalculated every round. Fitness is used to select and sort traders. Each round represents a generation. The traders are divided into buyer and seller populations. Three genetic operations are performed on the current price offers of each population: reproduction, crossover, and mutation. The exact nature of these operations will be clarified below. Information is exchanged solely within each type of trader. There is no explicit exchange of information between buyers and sellers.
Genetic Programming
Pseudocode describing the actions of a seller and buyer depending on the outcome of the last round. In any event, the focus rule requires that we must bid lower for sellers and higher for buyers each round. Otherwise the price would not converge.
After building a stable fixed-rule auction, one of the players was replaced with an agent that evolves a set of rules. The agent evolved a set of rules using a genetic programming algorithm. A genetic program (GP) is an adaptive learning system based on many of the principles of the genetic algorithm. A decision tree represents the rules that outputs the bid submitted to the auction. The agent was built using functions and terminal nodes. For fimctions the following algebraic and logical operators were used: summation, subtraction, multiplication, division, "if-then-else", "and", "or".
Roth/Erv Learning Algorithm
The Roth/Erv learning algorithm is also under investigation. This algorithm uses a probabilistic rule for generating a bid based on the behavior of past auctions. The basic intuition underlying reinforcement learning is that the tendency to implement an action should be strengthened (reinforced) if it produces favorable results and weakened if it produces unfavorable results. The Roth-Erv algorithm (RE algorithm) is a particular reinforcement-learning algorithm developed by Roth and Erev on the basis of findings from a wide variety of human-subject experiments. In the present context, the buyers and sellers are assumed to use the RE algorithm to update the probabilities with which they choose among their feasible bid or ask prices at the end of each auction round,
Other Bidding Algorithms
Other bidding algorithms have been implemented and tested. These algorithms include: genetic algorithm selection of forecasting technique, fizzy logic generation of maximum profit bid, and heuristic bid generation strategies based on double auctions by humans. The selection of forecasting algorithms used the following techniques: artificial neural networks, autoregressive moving average, econometric, exponential smoothing, Hartley transform, Fourier transform, and state space techniques.
Results and Discussion
After building a stable model of the auction, simulations demonstrated that some of the players "misbehaved" and attempted different strategies. In these simulations, the ICA was not allowed to intervene, except to match according to the market rules.
First, one of the sellers attempted consistently to offer lower prices than the others (predatory pricing). The predatory pricing would drive the competition out, justified later by increasing the price by the remaining player, thus creating a certain state of monopoly. For a 10-buyer/seller auction the effect of one single player occasionally offering lower prices may seem negligible. However, it turned out that the seller was able to drive the price down by more than 10'%o only after 100 rounds. The equilibrium price actually fell off exponentially, approaching zero.
Figures will show the equilibrium price when the seller's reduced offer is on average twice higher than the regular decrement to the offer price no matter the outcome of the previous sell offer. One, two, three and four sellers consequently employed the tactic during our simulations. It is interesting to see that after the initial sharp reduction of the equilibrium price b y more that 10YO, there was no significant difference when the second, third and fourth player engaged in predatory pricing. This suggests that if a company has a few generators, each of them participating in the market, the company may randomly designate each generator as a predator during every round, making it difficult to spot such malicious behavior, yet achieving the goal of lowering the price. This would allow the seller to efficiently eliminate other sellers within some period of time. Other cases have been emulated and tabulated with similarly interesting results.
Observations on Market Power
Consideration should be given to assessing the market power of each seller. A seller is said to have unilateral market power if a unilateral deviation from a competitive equilibrium is profitable for that seller, given that all other traders continue to use the strategies that generated the competitive equilibrium. The market power in this case is directly proportional to the market share. In a 10-seller market, each seller has 10'%0 of the market share, hence 10% market power, given that all sellers trade fixed amo~ts of electricityy and all buyers are willing to buy regardless of the price. The situation would get complicated if unequal quantities of electricity are traded, if the buyers also have market power, if the number of buyers does not equal the number of sellers and each traded unit of electricity has different characteristics (reliability for example).
Structural Market Power and Strategies
There is a difference between Structural Market Power and Strategic Market Power. First suppose that no trader misrepresents its true reservation value, i.e., suppose each buyer bids its true marginal revenue and each seller asks its true marginal cost. Under the protocols of the discriminatory auction, the exact relative positioning of the market demand and supply curves can still confer market power on some buyers and not on others and on some sellers and not on others. Call this structural market power. In the current movement to restructure the electricity industry, all participants are well aware that the choice of auction protocols can substantially affect their relative profitability. Thus, a consideration of the structural market power allocated to different market participants under alternative auction protocols would presumably be of major interest.
Second, by engaging in unilateral misrepresentation of their true reservation values, some buyers ruder some sellers may have potentially exercisable market power in addition to (or even in the absence of) structural market power. This (unilateral) is strategic market power.
An example, with appropriate figures, will be presented to show the difference between uniform and discriminatory pricing as explained in the following. If discriminatory pricing is used, the each player gets the price specified in the bid/ask. If uniform pricing is used, then the price for the halfway point between the highest determines all players ask and the lowest bid. Thus, buyer 1 receives more profit than it would have received with uniform pricing between the ask of seller 1 and the bid of buyer 1. Buyer 2 would receive less profit than it would have received with uniform pricing between the ask of seller 2 and the bid of buyer 2. The end result is that pricing mechanism favors the players where the counter party is more distant from the competitive equilibrium.
The strategies are very interesting for this case. Note that seller 1 and 2 only need to underbid seller 3 to sell all of their production. Thus, disclosure of true cost is not required. The same is true for buyer 1 and 2 with respect to buyer 3. Seller 3 and buyer 3 are disadvantaged since they cannot sell nor buy the quantity desired.
Also consider the special case of limited suppliers and revealed buyers (to be shown with figures). Assume that the sellers have been limited to these three due to congestion or to historical development. Consider if the buyers have revealed their valuation due to lingering regulations. Thus, there is only one buy price known to all sellers. If the sellers are profit takers, and if the buyers must obtain the necessary quantity. Then, the sellers should charge a price above the competitive equilibrium but just below that price enabling other sellers to enter. This case has been observed in our market emulations. The same outcome is ensured if the sellers have sufficient money to wait out the buyers. Thus, the sellers collect large amounts of monopoly rents.
Suggested Research Program
Further work has to be done to assess the effect of buyers on auction markets. Another direction into which the research might go is estimating the market power of agents under different market conditions. Also, probabilistic analysis of the auction model should be carried out, which will allow for a priori estimation of the effect of different actions of buyers and sellers on the market. Additional work is needed to investigate alternate auction mechanisms. Additional work is needed to investigate the importance of ATC forecasting and strictness of guarantee to deliver. This summary includes the results reported in four recent papers. Some of these results will be presented this fall at the North American Power Conference. Others are being submitted as special journal papers for a special issue of the IEEE Evolutionary Computation Journal. It is important to note that this is a work in progress and future improvements to the model, such as implementing a power grid, modeling congestion and including smart agents, are being actively considered.
This author is deeply indebted to my co-principal investigator on one of these research projects, Dr. Leigh Tesfatsion, Professor of Economics at Iowa State University. He is also deeply indebted to the graduate students who have done programming and extensive testing for this work: Valentin Petrov, James Nicolaisen, Derek Lane, Alex Kroujiline, and Matthew Smith. He is also indebted to the students who provided the predecessor work: Charles Richter, Jayant Kumar, Somgiat Dekrajangpetch, Hao Wu, and Kah-Hoe Ng. This panel is designedto garnerinsightson thesequestionsfrom severalnon-distributioncompany perspectives,including;a macro-econometric view, as well as regulatory,consumeradvocate, municipalpower,and industrialsegmentenergy lobbyistoutlooks, Such insightswill help the electricindustrybetter understandhow, in the future, they maybe judged in termsof providing reliableand adequateservice.
